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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
In 1992, the European Union and the United States reached an agreement that 
would limit subsidies given to the aircraft industry, that is, to Airbus and 
Boeing. However, this agreement still allows the respective governments to 
give, as a subsidy, one third of the development costs and various forms of 
variable costs (see Irwin and Pavcnik (2004)). On the other hand, both 
companies would undoubtedly save both development and variable costs by co-
operating, the extreme of which would be the merging of these firms. In the 
case of a merger, there would also be the added benefit of obtaining a 
potential monopoly position (practically) for aircraft production. Such a merger 
would increase profit. The explanation is straightforward: the merged enterprise 
could always keep the initial production pattern and so any change in this 
pattern must lead to an increase in profit. This contrasts with the results to be 
obtained in relation to strategic trade and industrial policies because, as will be 
shown,  typically, while the optimal policy in the case of national firms is 
subsidy, it is tax in the case of an international merger. A result, in this paper, 
is that with this optimal taxation the merger may not be profitable. It is 
noteworthy that this may be so even if there are no subsidies for national 
firms, that is, optimal taxation may, in itself, be sufficient to prevent 
international mergers.  
 
I analyse duopolistic situations where two firms in different countries produce 
either a homogenous good or two heterogenous goods. These firms compete 
either by adjusting quantities (Cournot duopoly) or by adjusting prices 
(Bertrand duopoly).  The owners of these firms bargain over a horizontal 
merger, that is, over the equity shares of the merged enterprise and the 
division of the merger profit. This is modelled as a Nash bargaining game with 
equal bargaining strengths. If there were no policies, the solution is the familiar 
split-the-difference division: each owner-group obtains its initial pre-merger 
profit  plus half of the merger surplus. The introduction of  production 
subsidies/taxes complicates the situation in many ways. As an example, 
consider the basic case to be presented in Sec.3  where the two merging firms 
produce a homogenous good with constant unit-costs under Cournot 
competition and export this good to a third country. Here, the pre-merger 
optimal policy is subsidization and the post-merger optimal policy is taxation. It 
will be shown that in this basic case the merger is never profitable with optimal 
policies.  
 
 
Subsequently, I modify this basic case. For simplicity, I assume in all these 
modifications that unit costs are similar. First, the good's domestic 
consumption does not change the conclusion that the merger is not profitable 
with optimal policies. An additional element is that the larger country with 
larger consumption of the good has a lower tax (or even a subsidy). Second, I 
introduce two heterogenous goods which can be produced in the respective 
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countries only. Under Cournot competition it can be shown, again, that with 
policies the merger is not profitable. On the other hand, if the firms compete in 
Bertrand fashion, optimal policies, both pre-merger and post- merger, are taxes. 
We may expect that because the merger- ownership is shared the taxes are 
then larger. As will be shown, the merger is now profitable if the goods' 
substitutability is even modest. The monopoly advantages are then larger than 
the disadvantages caused by higher taxes.  
 
 
In the relevant literature, the well-known result in Brander and Spencer (1985)  
is that in a Cournot duopoly with national firms in different countries, a 
production subsidy is an optimal policy. This was subsequently modified in 
several ways. Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed that in a Bertrand-duopoly a 
production tax is optimal in both countries if all production is exported to a 
third country. Dixit (1984) showed that if there are several Cournot-
competitive firms in the policy country, a tax may well be optimal. This is so 
because a subsidy to one domestic firm is, in itself, harmful to other domestic 
firms. In all of these, the firms are owned by nationals. A further modification 
concerns cross-ownership of the imperfectly competitive firms. Lee (1990) and 
Dick (1993) showed that if these firms are partially owned by foreigners, 
subsidy recommendation may change to tax because a part of the benefit 
caused by a subsidy goes to foreigners. In both Lee (1990) and Dick (1993), 
the firms continue to make independent production decisions from which 
ownership is separated and the cross-ownership shares are modelled as 
exogenous. An extension concerns the subsidization or taxation of research and 
development (R&D), instead of final goods. As shown by Brander and Spencer 
(1983), subsidization is still optimal. However, as presented by Qiu and Tao 
(1998), if there are considerable exogenous spill-overs from the R&D activity 
to foreign firms, subsidy recommendation may be reversed. Zhou et al. (2001) 
discuss investment taxes and subsidies in a duopoly situation that entails a low 
product quality country (firm) and a high quality country (firm), both of which 
export to a third country. They discovered that under Cournot competition a 
tax is optimal in the low-quality country while a subsidy is optimal in the high-
quality country. Joint welfare is increased by taxes in both countries. 
 
 
Section 2 presents the general framework of the models to be applied. Section 
3 deals with the basic case. The influence of domestic consumption is 
discussed in Section 4. Heterogenous goods are introduced in Sections 5 and 6. 
In the former, the firms adjust quantities while in the latter they adjust prices. 
Concluding remarks and suggestions for a wider framework are offered in 
Section 7. 
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2. THE MODEL 
 
There are two countries, denoted by the letters h (h-country) and f (f-
country). A standard model is applied (see, e.g., Markusen and Venables 
(1988)). Each country has a single factor of production, labor, the endowment 
of which is Lh in h-country and Lf in f-country. These shares are normalized so 
that  Lh + Lf = 1. Labor is used in two production sectors in both countries. 
The first is a competitive sector where a tradable, composite good is produced 
in both countries under constant returns to scale. The second sector is 
imperfectly competitive, producing a single homogenous good or two 
differentiated goods. In the production of this good (these goods) there are 
two national firms, firm 1 in h-country, owned by h-country residents, and firm 
2 in f-country, owned by f-country residents. These firms consider merging.  
Marginal production costs are constant. Unless otherwise stated, these costs 
are assumed similar to the firms, pre-merger and post-merger and, by choosing 
the units suitably, we may set them equal to zero. The governments' policy 
instruments are a production tax or subsidy. For h-country it is denoted by s1 
per production unit. If s1 > 0 we speak of a subsidy, but if s1 < 0 we speak of a 
tax. The corresponding denotation for f-country is s2. There are no trading 
costs and the markets are integrated. The demand for this good (these goods) 
takes a linear form. I analyse a dynamic game with complete information for the 
following moves.  First, two national firms decide whether to merge or not. 
Second, given a merger, they bargain over the ownership shares. This is 
formulated as a Nash bargaining game with equal bargaining strengths. Third, 
the governments set optimal subsidies or taxes separately. Fourth, firms 
choose outputs or prices. This dynamic game is solved by backward induction 
and it is, accordingly, subgame perfect. 
 
 
 
Let us start with one homogenous good and Cournot competition. The overall 
demand for this good is, in inverse form, 
  
        p = A – q               (1) 
 
 
where  p denotes the price of the good, A is a constant and q is, in market 
equilibrium,  the combined supply of both countries. With national firms q = 
q1+q2, where q1 is the production in h-country and q2 in f-country. Firms adjust 
their production quantities so that their profits are maximized at all levels of 
subsidies/taxes. The optimal subsidy/tax for h-country is obtained by 
maximizing the indirect utility function wh(p,Ih) with respect to s1, applying Roy's identity and assuming constant marginal utility of income, normalized to 
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unity. The income in h-country, Ih, consists of labor income plus the profit of 
the national firm (or the share in the merger profit) minus subsidy costs (or 
plus the tax revenue). For example, in h-country, with a non-merged firm the 
income Ih  is equal to Lh +π1 - s1q1, where wages are normalized to unity and 
π1 denotes the profit of the national firm 1. In later sections, I will extend this model to situations where there are two differentiated goods under Cournot 
competition and Bertrand-competition in the pre-merger situation. 
 
 
 
3. THE BASIC CASE 
 
 
Here a single homogenous good is produced and all of it is exported to a third 
country. To begin with, we assume similar unit costs, normalized to zero. The 
zero cost also applies to the merged enterprise, which implies that there are no 
production synergies from the merger. In this section and in the next section, it 
is assumed that the merged enterprise can shift production of the good from 
one country to the other at no cost (except the potential costs via policy 
changes such shifts may cause). National firms compete in Cournot fashion. 
Familiar results ensue: if national firms are domestically owned, subsidization is 
the optimal policy in both countries. If subsidies are given to the firms their  
profits are π1 = π2 = (A/2.5)2 = 0.16A2. Here, these subsidies for national firms are not decisive regarding my conclusions. To show this later on, I 
calculated the profits without policies which are equal to  (A/3)2. Next,  firms 1 
and 2 merge (or consider merging at least). Obviously, without policies it does 
not matter where the merged firm produces. Optimal policies change this. 
Assume first that the merged enterprise produces a fraction k of the overall 
production of the good, q, in h-country and 1-k in f-country, 0 < k < 1. These 
production shares are assumed exogenous. This implies that they are policy-
independent. The merged enterprise chooses q so that its profit π = (p+s1)kq 
+ (p+s2)(1-k)q  is maximized. In that which follows, I continue to use the letter π without subscripts to refer to the profit of the merged enterprise. 
Subsequently, the governments choose optimal policies to maximize welfare. 
These policies are  
 
 
             s1 = -2(1-z)q/k  =   - (1-z)A/2k        (2a)  
 
             s2 =  - 2zq/(1-k)  =  - zA/[2(1-k)]    (2b) 
 
 
where z denotes the share of the merged enterprise (and its profits) belonging 
to h-country residents (owners of firm 1) while 1-z is the share which belongs 
to f-country residents (owners of firm 2), 0≤ z ≤ 1. As Eqs. (2a) and (2b) 
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show, the optimal policy is taxation in both countries and the larger the 
ownership share, z or 1-z, is in a country, the smaller is the unit tax. This will be 
discussed later on. Additionally,  the larger the production share, k or 1-k, is in 
a country, the lower is the unit tax there. And vice versa: with a very small 
production share in one country the tax would be very large there. The intuitive 
explanation is that a higher tax on a smaller production share does not affect 
the overall profit so much while it increases tax revenue. With production in 
both countries and optimal taxes, the overall profit of the merged firm can be 
shown to be π = (A/4)2.  
 
 
On the other hand, if all production is concentrated in h-country, its optimal 
tax, denoted by s, can be shown as  
  
 
        s = -2(1-z)q = -(1-z)A/(4-2z)           (3a) 
 
 
If all production takes place in f-country, the optimal tax there is 
 
 
        s =  -2zq = -zA/(2+2z)                (3b) 
 
 
In (3a) s is an increasing function of z and in (3b) an increasing function of 1-z. 
A higher tax decreases profit. With a small ownership share, a large part of this 
loss is borne by foreigners. As may be seen, if the producing country 
inhabitants own the whole merged enterprise the optimal tax there is zero: 
because the firm has a monopoly there is no strategic motivation for taxation 
(or subsidization). 
 
 
If h-country is the producer the merger profit is  
 
 
      π = q2 = [A/(4-2z)]2                    (4a) 
 
 
while if f-country is the producer the profit is 
 
 
      π = q2 = [A/(2+2z)]2                 (4b) 
 
 
The country with the largest profit is chosen. As Eqs. (4a)-(4b) show, it is h-
country  if z > ½ and f-country if z < ½. In other words, the chosen country is 
the one whose residents own a majority share of the merged enterprise. We 
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may see that the profit is larger when the good is produced in one country 
instead of in both countries because in the latter case the merger profit is 
(A/4)2. In conclusion, the merged enterprise concentrates the production into 
one country.  
 
 
 
How are the ownership-shares determined? These merger shares are bargained 
for between the native owners of the two national firms and this bargaining 
concerns the division of the profit of the merged enterprise. Here, I apply a 
standard Nash bargaining model with equal bargaining strengths. Apart from 
satisfying certain plausible axioms, as presented by Nash (1953), this game has 
an additional strength. As was shown by Binmore et al. (1986), the solution of 
this Nash bargaining game is the same as in a dynamic game of alternating 
offers when the length of a single bargaining period approaches zero. This 
solution is reached instantaneously. In a Nash bargaining game, the solution is 
obtained by maximizing the Nash product. For our purposes, the Nash product 
is [zπ-π1][(1-z)π-π2], which is maximized with respect to z. In game 
theoretical terms, the national firms' profits π1 and π2 represent disagreement 
points that ensue if the bargaining does not come to an agreeable sharing of 
the merger profit π. The feasibility requires that zπ > π1 and that (1-z)π > π2. 
Obviously, a sufficient condition for non-feasibility is that π < π1 + π2 because 
at least one owner-group loses from merging. Notice that in the Nash-product 
the profits also present utilities because we have already assumed the marginal 
utility of income to be equal to one. The first order condition which applies to 
all our cases can be shown to be 
 
 
  
π + z(∂π/∂z)                   π  + (1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z)) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––         (5) 
zπ  - π1                             (1-z)π - π2 
 
 
 From the profit maximization by the merged enterprise producing a single 
homogenous good, we obtain the production quantity q, price p and, 
consequently, the  profit π as functions of policy s. If production takes place in 
h-country, we differentiate  Eq. (3a)  with respect to s, invert the derivative 
and insert it into the differentiated form of the profit function. Because above 
the national firms profits were similar, we may set them equal to zero. Eq. (5) 
becomes 
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      π + 2zq2/(2-z)                   π  - 2(1-z)q2/(2-z) 
     –––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––         (6a) 
           zπ                                     (1-z)π   
 
 
If production takes place in f-country we differentiate Eq. (3b) and proceed as 
above. This yields Eq. (5) as 
 
 
 
      π - 2zq2/(1+z)                     π + 2(1-z)q2/(1+z) 
      –––––––––––––      =             ––––––––––––––––––––         (6b) 
             zπ                                     (1-z)π   
 
 
It may now be inferred from Eqs. (6a) and (6b) that the residents in the 
producing country obtain a larger share of the merged enterprise because a 
larger numerator must correspond to a larger denominator. This outcome may 
seem counter-intuitive. After all, the national firms were quite similar. However, 
a larger ownership share in the producing country means lower tax there. A 
part of the consequent increase in the merger profit goes to the owners in the 
non-producing country. Another question is whether this is large enough to 
compensate for the loss caused by the lower ownership-share. I leave this 
question open. Without policies the sharing is equal, that is, z = (1-z) = ½ as 
may be seen from Eq. (5). 
 
 
 
Other games yield other results. If side-payments (ex ante lump-sum transfers) 
are allowed, the division of the merger profit changes once again (for side-
payments, see, e.g., Weber (1994)). Let T denote the side-payment of firm 1's 
owners to firm 2's owners. Net merger profit for firm 1's owners is  zπ -T. 
Correspondingly, it is (1-z)π+T for firm 2's owners. Again, by choosing the 
units suitably, we may set π1 = π2 = 0. The Nash product is now [zπ – T][(1-z)π + T]. By differentiating this with respect to T, the new first order condition 
becomes 
 
 
 
     T = -(1/2)(1- 2z)π                                            (7) 
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From Eq. (7), the income for h-country residents is zπ – T = π/2 and so this 
bargaining game yields equal sharing.  
 
A central question is how do optimal policies affect the merger feasibility. 
Without policies, the merger profit is always larger than the sum of the profits 
of the national firms because the merged enterprise could always produce the 
earlier overall quantity. Consequently, any changes must increase profit and 
there is an incentive for merging. With policies this may not be so. After all, the 
policy changes from subsidies to taxation. The sum of national firms’ profits is 
0.32A2  which is always larger than the merger profit because the latter is 
always smaller than A2/4 = 0.25A2, as can be seen from Eqs. (4a) and (4b). 
Accordingly, at least one of the owner-groups of the two national firms loses 
from the merger. In other words, optimal trade and industrial policies make the 
merger unprofitable and infeasible. This does not decisively depend on the fact 
that the national firms were subsidized. By comparing the merger profit with 
the sum of national firms profit without subsidies (=2(A/3)2) we may see, from 
Eqs. (4a) and (4b), that the merger is feasible only if the producing country 
residents own, approximately, more than 93 per cent of the merged enterprise,  
 
 
 
The question emerges whether the merger is good from a welfare point of 
view. In the basic case, the relevant (normalized) utility concepts in a situation 
of national firms is the profit of the respective firm minus subsidy costs. These 
may be shown to be equal to (1/2)(A/2.5)2 for each country. In a merger 
situation, the utility of the producing country is its share of the merger profit 
plus tax income. In the other country, it is simply the share of the merger profit 
going there. If the production takes place in h-country, its utility can be shown 
to be equal to (1/2)A2/(4-2z). We may directly see that it is, for all values of 
z, larger than h-country's utility with national firms. f-country's utility is (1-z) 
[A/(4-2z)]2, which is a decreasing function of z. As was shown previously, the 
bargaining results for the producing h-country in a share z, which is equal or 
larger than ½. With equal sharing, f-country’s welfare is smaller with a merger 
than with national firms. Consequently, so it is with larger h-country shares. 
Analogous reasoning applies if f-country is the producing country. The 
conclusion is that in the basic case the merger raises the welfare of the 
producing country and decreases the welfare of the non-producing country. 
This depends on the tax income in the producing country and the 
corresponding lack of this revenue in the other country.  
 
 
 
So far, it has been assumed that the governments did not cooperate with each 
other. Brander and Spencer (1985) showed for a homogenous goods duopoly 
with national firms that if both countries maximize separately the combined 
welfare of both countries and take the other country's policy as exogenous it is 
optimal to pay lower subsidies than in a non-cooperative situation. In particular, 
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if both countries export all their production to a third country, the optimal 
policy reverses to taxation. In the merger case, nearly the opposite ensues. 
Maximizing the combined welfare of the two countries with respect to the 
policy variable yields the outcome that laissez-fair is the optimal policy, both 
with shared production and with concentrated production. In itself, this is not 
surprising. We are dealing with a monopoly, so there are no strategic motives 
for taxation or subsidizing, nor are there policy motives caused by foreign 
ownership if all merger ownership is in h- and f-countries, as was assumed. 
Obviously, with co-operative pre- and post-merger policies, as presented above, 
the merger is always feasible. 
 
 
 
Above, we have assumed equal costs. Let us consider a situation where these 
costs differ. By choosing the units suitably, assume the unit production cost in 
h-country to be c , c > 0, while in f-country it is equal to zero. Proceeding as 
above, it can be shown that the two conclusions still hold. First, it is always 
profitable to concentrate the production in one country. Second, the merger is 
never feasible with optimal policies. As can be shown, the sum of the profits of 
the national firms is always larger than (1/3.88)A2, while the merger profit is 
always smaller than (1/4)A2.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.  DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION 
 
 
If there is domestic consumption of the good, it may be expected that pre-
merger subsidies would be higher and post-merger taxes lower. I analyze a case 
where the homogenous good is fully consumed in h- and f-countries. The size 
of the relative consumption in the two countries can be measured by 
(normalized) labour endowments, Lh and Lf, Lh+Lf= 1. Similar constant 
production costs (normalized to zero) are assumed. In the initial situation of 
national firms, by applying standard methods, we obtain, as optimal policies, 
subsidies which are equal to s1 = LhA and s2 = LfA. In the larger country, the subsidy is larger because there are more consumers who benefit from the 
subsidy-induced price fall. If all is consumed in one country, laissez fair is the 
optimal policy in the other country. Furthermore, at least one of the subsidies 
is larger than in the basic case, in which the subsidies are both equal to A/5. 
The profits of the national firms can be shown to be π1  = (LhA)2 and π2  = 
(LfA)2. The sum of these profits is (2Lh2-2Lh+1)A2, which obtains its minimum 
value at Lh = ½. Inserting this, we may see that the sum of the national firms' 
profits is larger than A2/2. In an extreme situation where all is consumed in one 
of the two countries, this country pays so large a subsidy to its firm that the 
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other firm's profit is nil. This firm closes and the merger question becomes 
irrelevant. In the following, I assume that there is consumption in both 
countries. 
 
 
 
If the two firms merge and the k:th part is produced in h-country and the (1-
k)th part in f-country, 0 < k < 1, the policies are s1 = -2(1-z- Lh/2)q/k  and s2 
= -2(z –Lf/2 )q/(1-k). The merger profit is π = (A/3)2. Unlike in the basic case,  
here the optimal policy may be subsidy if a country is large and its inhabitants 
own a large share of the merged enterprise. On the other hand, if all production 
is concentrated in one country, the optimal policy is, if h-country is the 
producing country,  
 
 
                        s = -2(1-z-Lh/2)q                     (8a) 
 
 
 
 or, if f-country is the producer,  
 
 
                       s = -2(z – Lf/2)q                         (8b)     
 
 
The country with the smaller tax, hence the larger profit, is chosen. This 
depends on the ownership-shares and country sizes. If all production takes 
place in h-country, the merger profit is 
 
 
                      π = q2 = [A/(4-2z- Lh)]2                     (9a) 
 
 
 
and if all production is in f-country, 
 
 
 
                     π = q2 =[A/(2+2z- Lf)]2           (9b) 
 
 
 
The merger profit is always larger than (A/2.5)2. For example, if h-country is 
chosen it must be that the denominator of (9a) is smaller than the 
denominator of (9b). In other words,  4-2z- Lh < 2+2z - Lf  = 2+2z -(1- Lh) = 
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1+2z+Lh or 2z+Lh > 3/2. We can see the result by inserting this into Eq. (9a). 
This also applies to f-country if it is the producing country. Because with 
shared production the merger profit was (A/3)2, here also it is profitable for 
the merged enterprise to concentrate production in one country only.  
 
 
 
The other question concerns the feasibility of the merger. By comparing 
profits, we may see that a sufficient condition for non-feasibility is that  4-2z- 
Lh > 1.42 or  2+2z- Lf > 1.42. Unless the countries and, at the same time, the 
ownership shares are very dissimilar, it is not profitable for the national firms to 
merge.   
 
 
 
The outcome of the merger game can be obtained by differentiating Eq. (8a) or 
(8b) and proceeding in a similar way as in the previous section. If production 
takes place in h-country, Eq. (5) becomes 
 
 
 
        π + 2zq2/(2-z-Lh/2)             π  -  2(1-z)q2/(2-z-Lh/2) 
        –––––––––––––------      =       ––––––––––––––––––––             ( 10a)   
                   zπ  - π1                               (1-z)π   - π2   
                 
 
 
If production is in f-country,  Eq. (5) is 
 
 
 
       π -  2zq2/(1+z-Lf/2)               π  +  2(1-z)q2/(1+z-Lf/2) 
         –––––––––––––             =           ––––––––––––––––––––         (10b) 
             zπ  - π1                                    (1-z)π   - π2   
 
 
 
For various reasons, the production is likely to take place in the larger country. 
As Eqs. (8a) and (8b) show, a larger country size leads to a lower post-merger 
tax due to consumer effects. Besides, with national firms the subsidy is larger 
in the larger country and so the profit, π1 or π2 , is larger there. As shown by 
Eqs. (10a) or (10b), this contributes to a larger share. This, in itself, further 
reduces the tax. Both of these reasons yield a larger merger profit. In relation 
to co-operative policies, it can be shown that a post-merger subsidy is the 
optimal policy. 
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5. HETEROGENOUS GOODS: COURNOT-COMPETITION 
 
 
In the following two sections I extend the discussion into differentiated goods, good 1 
and good 2. Unlike in the previous sections, the production sites are now inflexible:   
good 1 may be produced in h-country only and good 2 in f-country only, pre- and post- 
merger. This may be justified, e.g., by assuming sunk costs. The production 
costs of the two goods are constant, similar and normalized to zero.  All is exported to 
a third country. There is a quadratic sub-utility function for these goods which yields 
linear demands. In the present section, the firms adjust quantities and the inverted 
demand functions are  p1  = C – q1 – ßq2 and p2  = C – q2 – ßq1, where C is a 
constant, p1 and p2 are the prices of respective goods, and q1 and q2 are their 
production quantities. Goods 1 and 2 are imperfect substitutes, that is, 0 < ß < 1. In 
the initial situation, there are two national firms, firm 1 in h-country producing good 1 
and firm 2 in f-country producing good 2. Similar results ensue as with the 
homogenous good: it is optimal for both governments to pay subsidies. The profits of 
the firms with these subsidies are π1 = π2 = [C/(2+ß- 0.5ß2)]2. 
 
 
 
Let us now turn to a situation in which firms 1 and 2 merge. Good 1 is 
produced in h-country in plant 1 of the merged enterprise and good 2 in f-
country in plant 2. The plants use separate accounting so that the government 
may tax or subsidize the production of the domestic plants. The merger 
situation is formulated as a joint maximization of the combined profit π =  
(p1+s1)q1 + (p2+s2)q2. Maximizing this yields the production quantities (and 
the prices) as functions of policies s1 and s2. Welfare maximization by the governments yields the key expressions for optimal policies as: 
 
 
          s1 = -2(1-z)(1-ß2)q1                                           (11a) 
 
 
 
in h-country. Correspondingly, in f-country, as 
  
 
         s2  = -2z(1-ß
2)q2                                              (11b)                                           
 
 
 
Taxing is the optimal policy in both countries if ownership is shared. There is a 
motive for taxation because a part of it is paid by foreign shareholders. On the 
other hand, suppose the merged enterprise is fully h-country owned (z=1). 
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Then the h-country optimal tax is zero as Eq. (11a) shows: obviously there is 
no strategic motive for taxation (or subsidization). Now, however, there is a 
strong motive for taxation in f-country, as shown by Eq. (11b), because all 
profits go to h-country.  
 
 
The merger game is similar to that presented in Sec. 3: The merger is bargained 
over between the native owners of the two national firms. This bargaining 
concerns the sharing of the merged enterprise and its profit and the bargaining 
solution is obtained by maximizing the Nash- product. The first order condition 
is as presented in Eq. (5). Its terms can be obtained by differentiating Eq. 
(11a) with respect to s1 and Eq. (11b) with respect to s2 . The inverted terms are then inserted into the differentiated form of the profit function π = 
π(s1,s2), yielding the terms in Eq. (5) as    
 
 
        z(∂π/∂z)   
                                                                                                     (12a) 
       = 2z(q1)2(1-ß2)/(2-z)  -  2z(q2)
2(1-ß2)/ (1+z)                                                          
 
 
 and   
     
 
       (1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z))  =      
                                                                                                       (12b) 
    -  2(1- z)(q1)
2(1-ß2)/(2-z)   +  2(1-z)(q2)
2(1-ß2)/(1+z)  
 
 
 
The solution of the whole dynamic game is such that the production quantities, 
taxes and ownership shares are similar in the two countries and for the two 
goods, as may be inferred from profit maximization and Eqs. (5), (11a), (11b), 
(12a) and (12b). The merger profit for each owner-group is π/2  =   
(1+ß) C2/(3+2ß-ß2)2. It can be shown, e.g. by simulating, that this is always 
smaller than the profit of a national firm. Consequently, the merger is not 
feasible for any values of ß. 
 
 
 
In relation to welfare in the merger situation,  it is, for each country, half of the 
merger profit plus tax income. This can be shown to be  equal to  
(2+ß-ß2)C2/(3+2ß-ß2)2. In the initial situation with national firms, each  
country's welfare is the national firm's profit minus subsidy costs, which is 
equal to (1-ß2/2)C2/ (2+ß-ß2/2)2 . This is larger than the welfare in the merger 
situation only if ß < 0.42 (approximately). Otherwise, the merger increases 
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welfare. Obviously, this depends on tax revenues because the merger was 
shown to be non-profitable to the owners. This is clarified by considering a 
situation where there are no subsidies for national firms. Here the merger 
increases welfare if ß > 0.5 (approximately). 
 
 
 
 
 
6. HETEROGENOUS GOODS: BERTRAND COMPETITION 
 
 
 
I continue to consider a situation with two differentiated goods. Good 1 is 
produced, pre- and post- merger, in h-country and good 2 in f- country. The 
difference here is that firms adjust prices instead of quantities. The demands 
for the two goods are linear: q1 = B – p1 + bp2  and q2= B – p2 + bp1, 
 where B is constant and b describes the substitutability between goods,  0 < b < 1. The other denotations are the same as in the previous section. I continue 
to assume zero costs, inflexibility of production sites and that all is exported to 
a third country. In the initial duopoly situation of national firms, the optimal 
policy in both countries is taxation (as is well-known, see Eaton and Grossman 
(1986)). The firms' profits are equal to π1 = π2 = B2 (2-b2)2 / (4-2b – b2)2.  
 
 
 
In the merger situation, the merged enterprise chooses the prices so as to 
maximize the combined profit. Optimal policies here are taxes in both countries. 
In h-country it is, for good 1, 
 
 
                         s1 = -2(1-z)q1                               (13a)  
 
and in f-country for good 2, 
   
 
 
                        s2 = -2zq2                              (13b)  
 
 
 
The merger game is still presented by Eq. (5). By differentiating Eq. (13a) with 
respect to s1 and Eq.(13b) with respect to s2  and proceeding as explained in the previous section, the terms in Eq. (5) become 
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z(∂π/∂z) = 2z(q1)2/(2-z)  -  2z(q2)
2/(1+z)                (14a)                                          
 
  
and       
 
 
 
(1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z)  =    -2(1- z)(q1)
2/(2-z)   +  2(1-z)(q2)
2/(1+z)   (14b) 
 
 
 
 
The solution of the dynamic game leads to equal production quantities and 
prices for the two goods, equal policies in the two countries and equal 
ownership sharing of the merged enterprise. Half of the merger profit is π/2 = 
B2/[(3-b)2(1-b)]. With reasonable degrees of subsitutability (b > 0.6 
approximately), this can be shown to be larger than a national firm's profit, that 
is, the merger is feasible. To recall, in the corresponding Cournot case the 
merger was never feasible. An obvious explanation is that now there are both 
pre-merger and post-merger taxes. On the other hand, shared ownership of the 
merged enterprise leads to higher tax. However, if the substitutability of goods 
is reasonable, the monopoly advantage annulls this. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
We have discussed cases where two firms in different countries plan to merge 
to form a monopoly. Optimal policies may make this merger infeasible. The 
situation becomes more complicated if there would be more firms. As an 
illustration, consider a situation where there are initially two firms in h-country 
and one firm in f-country. They produce (and trade) a homogenous good at 
zero cost under Cournot competition and export this good to a third country. It 
can be shown that in the initial situation with three national firms the optimal 
policy is laissez fair in h-country and subsidy in f- country. (If there would be 
three or more firms in h-country its policy would be tax, for reasons see Sec.1). 
Assume that any two of these three firms can merge while the third stays 
separate. The negotiation about merger ownership shares is modelled as a two-
players Nash bargaining game, presented in Sec.3. (For corresponding 
situations with coalitional games see Horn and Persson (2001)). Without 
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policies, all the merger combinations are equally profitable but with optimal 
policies there are several features which favour a domestic merger between the 
two h-country firms. First, in a domestic merger both owner-groups obtain half 
of the merger shares while in an international merger between the f-country 
firm and one of h-country firms, the share of this h-country firm's owners is 
decreased by the relative profits of the national firms, as shown in the 
denumerators of Eq. (5). Initially, f-country firm's profit is larger than the profit 
of a h-country firm because of f-country's subsidy. Second, as was shown in 
the beginning of Sec. 3, when there is one domestic merged enterprise and one 
foreign firm, this merger receives a subsidy while in an international merger the 
shared ownership in itself leads to decreased subsidies in both countries or 
even to a tax. Finally, notice that there is an additional effect from policies. As 
was shown in Sec. 3, if h-country firms merge and the f-country firm stays 
separate, optimal policies make forming a further merged monopoly infeasible. 
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DERIVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS  
 
SEC. 3. HOMOGENOUS GOOD. ALL EXPORTED TO A THIRD 
COUNTRY. SIMILAR PRODUCTION COSTS (=0). 
 
 
(i)  NATIONAL FIRMS: 
 
Firms' profit maximization: 
 
max  π1  = (p+s1)q1 = (A –q1 –q2 +s1)q1   , and     
 q1 
 
max  π2  = (p+s2)q2  = (A –q1 –q2 +s2)q2 
q2 
 
The first order conditions are 
 
∂π1/∂q1  = A – 2q1 –q2 +s1  = 0  
 
∂π2/∂q2  = A –q1 – 2q2 +s2 = 0 from which  
 
q1 = A –q1 –q2 +s1 = p + s1  and  q2 = p + s2 which yield 
 
π1 = q12    and   π2 = q22   
q1 = (A +2s1 –s2)/3   and q2 = (A +2s2 –s1)/3 
 
∂q1/∂s1 = ∂q2/∂s2 = 2/3  
∂p/∂s1 = ∂( q1 -s1)/∂s1 = -1/3 
 
h-country's normalized welfare is wh = π1 – s1q1 = q12 - s1q1. Maximizing: 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = 2q1(∂q1/∂s1) – q1 – s1(∂q1/∂s1)  
 
             = 2q1(2/3)) – q1 – s1(2/3) = 0. This yields  
s1 = (1/2)q1 .  
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Maximizing f-country's welfare yields, by symmetry, from ∂wf/∂s2 = 0:  
s2  = (1/2)q2 
 
Applying these yields q1 = q2 and s1 = s2. Consequently,  
 
   q1 = (A + q1/2)/3 from which  
   q1 = q2 = 2A/5, s1 =  s2 = A/5 
 
 
π1 = π2 = q12  =  q22   = (A/2.5)2 = 0.16A2 
 
wh = π1  - s1 q1  = (1/2)q12= (1/2) (A/2.5)2= 0.08A2.  
(Without policies set s1 = s2= 0. This yields 
 
π1 = π2 = (A/3)2.)  
 
 
(ii) MERGER: k and 1-k PRODUCTION 
 
Merger's profit maximization (notice p = A -q): 
 
max π = (p+s1)kq + (p+s2)(1-k)q =  pq + [ks1+(1-k)s2]q 
  q 
 
          = [A-q + ks1 + (1-k)s2]q 
 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q +ks1+(1-k)s2 = 0    from which  
q = A-q + ks1 + (1-k)s2 = p + ks1 + (1-k)s2           from which 
 
q = (1/2)[ A + ks1 + (1-k)s2]    
∂q/∂s1  = k/2    and   ∂q/∂s2 =  (1-k)/2  
∂p/∂s1 = ∂(A-q)/∂s1  =  -k/2   
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π = [p+ks1+(1-k)s2]q= q2 
 
h-country's welfare is  its share of the merger profit minus subsidy cost/plus 
tax revenue: 
 
wh  = zπ - s1kq. Maximizing: 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = z2q(∂q/∂s1) – kq  – s1k (∂q/∂s1)   
              
              =  zkq  –kq - s1k2/2   = 0 , from which  
 
 
s1 =  -2(1-z)q/k.      By symmetry, 
 
s2 = - 2zq/(1-k).  Note that k≠0,1       
Inserting 
 
 
q = (1/2)[ A + ks1 + (1-k)s2]  =  (1/2)[A – 2(1-z)q – 2zq]   
    = (1/2) (A -2q)         from which  q = A/4     
 
and so π = (A/4)2 and s1 =  - A(1-z)/2k and  s2 = - Az/2(1-k).  
 
 
 
(iii) MERGER: ALL PRODUCTION TO ONE COUNTRY  
 
max π = (p+s)q = (A-q+s)q where s = subsidy/tax in the producing country 
 q 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q+s = 0, from which 
 
q = A-q+s = p+s 
 
∂q/∂s = 1/2    and      ∂p/∂s = ∂q/∂s – 1 =  - ½ 
 
q = (1/2) (A+s) 
 
π = (p+s)q = q2     and     ∂π/∂s = 2q∂q/∂s = q 
 
If production is in h-country its normalized welfare is 
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wh = zπ  - sq. Maximizing: 
 
∂wh /∂s = z∂π/∂s – q – s∂q/∂s  
 
           = zq – q – s/2  = 0,  from which  
 
s   = -2(1-z)q < 0.   Inserting 
 
q = (1/2)(A - 2(1-z)q)      from which 
 
q(1 + (1-z)) = (1/2)A   or 
 
q = A / (4-2z) and so π = [A/(4-2z)]2 
 
and  s =  - A(1-z)/(2-z)  from which ∂s/∂z > 0 
 
Size of welfare: wh = zπ - sq =  zq2 + 2(1-z)q2 = (2-z)q2 = A2/ [4(2-z)] 
 
     = (1/2)A2/(4-2z) > (1/2)A2/4 >(1/2)A2/2.52 (h-country's welfare with                                           
                                                                              national firms) 
 
f- country's welfare is wf = (1-z)π = (1-z)q2 = (1-z)[A/(4-2z)]2 
 
∂wf/∂z =[A2/4](-2z/(2-z)4) < 0  
 
so because here z > ½, wf < (1/2)[A/3]2< (1/2)A2/2.52 
 
If the production is in f-country 
 
wf = (1-z)π– sq =  (1-z)q2 – sq . By symmetry, 
 
s = -2zq  
 
q = A/(2+2z). 
 
The welfare size:  
 
wf = (1-z)π - sq = (1- z)q2 + 2zq2 = (1+z)q2 = A2/ [4(1+z] 
 
     = (1/2)A2/(2+2z) > (1/2)A2/4 >(1/2)A2/2.52 
 
wh = zπ = zq2 = z[A/(2+z)]2 
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∂wh/∂z =A2(4-z2)/(2-z)4) > 0  
 
so because here z < ½, wh < (1/2)A2/2.52 
 
 
 
Three conclusions 
 
a) it is profitable for the merged enterprise to produce in one country only: 
π  =  q2 > [A/4]2 (the merger profit with shared production) 
 
 
b) If z ≠ 0,1, the merger profit is smaller than the sum of national firms' profits. 
That is, the merger is infeasible. 
 
c) the merger would increase the welfare of the producing country and 
decrease the welfare of the non-producing country 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-operative policies in the merger cases 
 
(ii) k:th part in h-contry and (1-k)th part in f-country 
 
wh = zπ - s1kq   and  wf= (1-z)π - s2(1-k)q, so 
 
wh+wf = π - s1kq  - s2(1-k)q  
 
A country takes the other country's policy as exogenous and we know that 
∂q/∂s1  = k/2    and   ∂q/∂s2 =  (1-k)/2 and π = q2.  
∂(wh+wf)/∂s1 = 2q(∂q/∂s1) -kq - s1(∂kq/∂s2) = kq-kq - s1(∂kq/∂s2)= 0 
 
From this, s1 = 0.  
In a similar way it can be shown that s2= 0. 
 
 
(iii) all produced in one country 
 
wh+wf  =  π – sq = q2- sq 
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∂(wh+wf) /∂s =  2q(∂q/∂s) – q – s(∂q/∂s) 
 
           =    q – q – s/2  = 0  or s = 0 
 
 
 
The merger game 
 
 
If production takes place in h-country  s = -2(1-z)q   and  so      
 
     ∂s/∂s = 2q(∂z/∂s) – 2(1-z)(∂q/∂s)  or 
 
      1      = 2q(∂z/∂s) - 2(1-z)(1/2) from which 
 
     ∂z/∂s = (2-z) / 2q from which ∂s/∂z = 2q/(2-z) = -∂s/∂(1-z)  
 
If production takes place in f-country  s = -2zq    and so 
 
     ∂s/∂s = -2q(∂z/∂s) – 2z(∂q/∂s)  or 
 
      ∂z/∂s = -(1+z) / 2q from which ∂s/∂z = -2q/(1+z) = -∂s/∂(1-z) 
 
 
 
STANDARD NASH BARGAINING GAME     
 
 
The Nash product is   
 
     max [zπ -π1][ (1-z)π-π2]  
When maximizing this with respect to z, the first order condition is 
 
[∂(zπ)/∂z][(1-z)π-π2] + {[∂(1-z)π]/∂z}{ zπ -π1}  = 0  or  
 [∂(zπ)/∂z][(1-z)π-π2] - {[(1-z)π]/∂(1-z} { zπ -π1}  = 0 or  
 
 
π + z(∂π/∂z)                   π  + (1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z)) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––         (5) 
zπ  - π1                             (1-z)π - π2 
 
In the basic case we know that ∂q/∂s = 1/2  and π = (p+s)q = q2  and  ∂π/∂s 
= 2q∂q/∂s, so 
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∂π/∂z =   (∂π/∂s)(∂s/∂z) = q(∂s/∂z) = -∂π/∂(1-z) 
 
 
If production is in h-country, ∂s/∂z = 2q/(2-z) = -∂s/∂(1-z) and Eq, (5) 
becomes  
 
 
π + 2zq2/(2-z)                   π  -  2(1-z)q2/(2-z) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––       
zπ - π1                              (1-z)π  - π2                           
 
If production is in f-country, ∂s/∂z = -2q/(1+z) = -∂s/∂(1-z), so (5) is 
 
 
π - 2zq2/(1+z)                   π  +  2(1-z)q2/(1+z) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––        
zπ - π1                              (1-z)π  - π2                     
 
Because π1 = π2 we can set them equal to zero by choosing the units suitably. 
 
 
BARGAINING WITH SIDE PAYMENTS 
 
c=0, π1 = π2 = 0. 
 
  
 max [zπ – T][(1-z)π + T] 
 T,z 
 
When differentiating with respect to T, the first order condition is 
 
- -[(1-z)π + T]  + zπ – T = 0 or T = -(1/2)(1-2z)π . 
 
 
Accordingly the profit going to h-country residents is 
 
         zπ – T = zπ + (1/2)(1-2z)π = (1/2)π 
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END-PART OF SEC.3. OTHERWISE AS ABOVE EXCEPT THAT 
COSTS NOT SIMILAR, c1= c > 0, c2 = 0  
 
(i)  NATIONAL FIRMS: 
 
max  π1  = (p+s1-c)q1 = (A –q1 –q2 +s1 -c)q1   , and     
 q1 
max  π2  = (p-c+s2)q2  = (A –q1 –q2 +s2)q2 
q2 
 The first order conditions (foc) are 
 
∂π1/∂q1  = A – 2q1 –q2 +s1 -c = 0   
 
∂π2/∂q2  = A –q1 – 2q2 +s2 = 0 from which because p = A –q1 –q2  
q1 = A –q1 –q2 +s1  -c = p + s1   -c 
 
q2 = A –q1 –q2 + s2  =  p + s2    which yield 
 
π1 = q12    and   π2 = q22 . Furthermore, solving the system,  
q1 = (A +2s1 –s2 - 2c)/3   and q2 = (A +2s2 –s1 +c)/3 
 
∂q1/∂s1 = ∂q2/∂s2 = 2/3  
From foc,  ∂p/∂s1 = ∂( q1 -s1+c)/∂s1 = -1/3 
 
h-country's welfare is wh = π1 – s1q1 = q12 - s1q1. Maximizing 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = 2q1(∂q1/∂s1) – q1 – s1(∂q1/∂s1)   
             = 2q1(2/3)) – q1 – s1(2/3) = 0 yielding 
 
s1 = (1/2)q1    
Similarly, for f-country from ∂wf/∂s2 = 0: 
 
 s2 = (1/2)q2 
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Applying these yields the system 
 
3q1 + 2q2 - 2A + 2c = 0  
2q1 + 3q2 - 2A        = 0 
 
Solving yields 
 
 q1 = (6A-18c)/15  = (2A-6c)/5 = 2s1  (this implies c < A/3) 
 
 q2 = (6A + 12c)/15 = (2A+4c)/5= 2s2 
 
π1 + π2  = q12 + q22 = (2/5)2[(A-3c)2 + (A+2c)2] = (2/5)2[2A2 -2Ac + 13c2]  
∂(π1 + π2)/∂c = (2/5)2(-2A+13c) 
 
Setting this equal to zero we obtain minimum at c = 2A/13. 
 
At this value π1 + π2 > (2/5)2(2- 4/13)A2 = (84/325)A2≈(1/3.87)A2 
 
This  implies that, with all possible values of c, 
 
 π1 + π2 > (1/3.88)A2    
 
 
 
 
(ii) MERGER: k VS. (1-k) PRODUCTION 
 
max π = (p+s1-c)kq + (p+s2)(1-k)q =  pq + [(s1-c)k+(1-k)s2]q   q 
 
          = [A-q + ks1  -kc + (1-k)s2]q 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q +ks1 -kc +(1-k)s2 = 0    from which 
 
q = A-q + ks1  -kc + (1-k)s2 = p + ks1 + (1-k)s2   -kc        from which  
q = (1/2)[ A + ks1 + (1-k)s2 -kc]   
 
∂q/∂s1  = k/2    and   ∂q/∂s2 =  (1-k)/2  
∂p/∂s1 = ∂(A-q)/∂s1  =  -k/2  and   ∂p/∂s2 = -(1-k)/2 
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π = [p+ks1+(1-k)s2-kc]q= q2 
 
h-country's welfare is wh  = zπ - s1kq. Maximizing 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = z2q(∂q/∂s1) – kq  – s1k (∂q/∂s1)   
              
              =  zkq  –kq - s1k2/2   = 0 , from which  
 
 
s1 =  - 2(1-z)q/k      By symmetry,  
s2 = - 2zq/(1-k).  Notice that k≠0,1      
 
 
Interpretation (again): The larger the production share is, the smaller the tax 
 
 
Inserting s1 and s2: 
 
q = (1/2)[ A + ks1 + (1-k)s2- kc]  =  (1/2)[A – 2(1-z)q – 2zq -kc]  
 
    = (1/2) (A -2q-kc)         from which  q = (A-kc)/4     
 
and so π = [(A-kc)/4)2 and s1 =  - (A-kc)(1-z)/k and  s2 = - (A-kc)z/(1-k). 
 
Notice for later use π = [(A-kc)/4)2 < [A/(2+2z]2 if z ≠ 1 
 
 
 
 
(iii)  MERGER: ALL PRODUCTION TO ONE COUNTRY: 
 
 
 
If all production is in h-country: 
 
 
max π = (p+s-c)q = (A-q+s-c)q 
 q 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q+s-c = 0, from which 
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q = A-q+s –c = p+s-c 
 
∂q/∂s = 1/2          ∂p/∂s = ∂q/∂s – 1 =  - ½ 
 
q = (1/2) (A+s-c) 
 
π = (p+s-c)q = q2          ∂π/∂s = 2q∂q/∂s 
 
wh = zπ – sq 
 
∂wh /∂s = z∂π/∂s – q – s∂q/∂s = 2zq(∂q/∂s) – q – s(∂q/∂s) 
 
           = zq – q – s/2  = 0,  from which  
 
s = -2(1-z)q* < 0.   Inserting 
 
q = (1/2)(A -c- 2(1-z)q)      from which 
 
q(1 + (1-z)) = (1/2)(A –c)  or 
 
q = (A-c) / (4-2z) and so      π = [(A-c) / (4-2z)]2 
 
 
 
If all production is in f-country 
 
 
max π = (p+s)q = (A-q+s)q 
 q 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q+s = 0, from which 
 
q = A-q+s  = p+s 
 
∂q/∂s = 1/2          ∂p/∂s = ∂q/∂s – 1 =  - ½ 
 
q = (1/2) (A+s) 
 
π = (p+s)q = q2          ∂π/∂s = 2q∂q/∂s 
 
wf = (1-z)π – sq 
 
∂wf /∂s = (1-z)∂π/∂s – q – s∂q/∂s = 2(1-z)q(∂q/∂s) – q – s(∂q/∂s) 
 
           = (1-z)q – q – s/2  = 0,  from which  
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s = -2zq,  q = [A/(2+2z)] , π = [A/(2+2z)]2 
 
 
Two conclusions: 
 
a) Because [A/(2+2z)]2 > [(A-kc)/4)2 it is profitable to concentrate 
production to one country only. A natural choice would be f-country. It does 
not need to be shown because if the merger profit would be larger in h-country 
(because of potential lower tax) the conclusion still holds. 
 
b) The merger is never feasible. If production is in h-country, the merger profit 
is 
 
π = [(A-c) / (4-2z)]2 < A2/4 
 
and if production is in f-country  
 
π = [A/(2+2z)]2 < A2/4 
 
while the sum of national firms' profits was 
 
π1 + π2 > (1/3.88)A2    
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SEC.4. ALL CONSUMED IN h-COUNTRY AND f-COUNTRY, 
SIMILAR COSTS (=0) 
 
(i) NATIONAL FIRMS  
 
max  π1  = (p+s1)q1 = (A –q1 –q2 +s1)q1   , and     
 q1 
 
max  π2  = (p+s2)q2  = (A –q1 –q2 +s2)q2 
q2 
 The first order conditions are 
 
∂π1/∂q1  = A – 2q1 –q2 +s1  = 0  and 
 
∂π2/∂q2  = A –q1 – 2q2 +s2 = 0 from which  
q1 = A –q1 –q2 +s1 = p + s1  and  q2 = p + s2 which yield 
 
π1 = q12    and   π2 = q22 . Furthermore,  
q1 = (A +2s1 –s2)/3   and q2 = (A +2s2 –s1)/3  
∂q1/∂s1 = ∂q2/∂s2 = 2/3 
 
∂p/∂s1 = ∂( q1 -s1)/∂s1 = -1/3  
h-country's welfare maximization: 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = -Lh(∂p/∂s1)(q1+q2)   + ∂( π1 – s1q1)/∂s1  
            = Lh(1/3)(q1+q2)  + 2q1(∂q1/∂s1) – q1 – s1(∂q1/∂s1)  
 
           =( Lh/3)(q1+q2 ) + 2q1(2/3)) – q1 – s1(2/3) = 0  or  
         Lh(q1+q2 ) + 4q1 – 3q1 – 2s1 = 0 or 
 
(Lh+1)q1      + Lhq2  =   2s1    Correspondingly, for f-country from ∂wf/∂s2= 0, 
 
(Lf+1)q2     + Lfq1  =   2s2  
  
32 
32 
Inserting q1 and q2: 
 
(Lh+1) (A +2s1 –s2)/3      + Lh(A +2s2 –s1)/3     =   2s1  
 
(Lf+1) (A +2s2 –s1)/3     + Lf(A +2s1 –s2)/3        =   2s2 or  
(4-Lh)s1 + (1-Lh)s2 = (1+2Lh)A 
 
(4-Lf)s2 + (1-Lf)s1 = (1+2Lf)A  
From these, (notice Lf = 1-Lh), 
 
[ (4-Lh) (4-Lf)- (1-Lh) (1-Lf)]s1 = (4-Lf)(1+2Lh)A - (1-Lh)(1+2Lf)A  
where 
 
(4-Lf)(1+2Lh)A - (1-Lh)(1+2Lf)A = (3+Lh) (1+2Lh)A - (1-Lh)(3 - 2Lh)A 
 
                                               = 12LhA 
and 
 
(4-Lh) (4-Lf)- (1-Lh) (1-Lf) = (4-Lh) (3+Lh)- (1-Lh)Lh = 12  
 
Accordingly s1 = LhA,   
By symmmetry, from f-country's welfare maximization: 
 
 s2 = LfA 
 
Using these: 
 
q1 = (A +2s1 –s2)/3 = [A +2LhA -(1-Lh)A]/3 = LhA 
 
q2 = LfA  
π1 +π2 = [(Lh) 2+(L f) 2]A2 = [Lh2+(1-Lh)2]A2 = (2Lh2-2Lh+1)A2 
 
≥ (1/2-1+1)A2= A2/2 because Lh = ½ gives the minimum value 
 
Why? d(2Lh2-2Lh+1)/dLh = 4Lh - 2 = 0. The extreme value Lh = ½ is obviously 
minimum. 
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(ii) MERGER: k and (1-k) PRODUCTION 
 
max π = (p+s1)kq + (p+s2)(1-k)q =  pq + [ks1+(1-k)s2]q   q 
 
          = [A-q + ks1 + (1-k)s2]q 
 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q +ks1+(1-k)s2 = 0    from which 
 
q = A-q + ks1 + (1-k)s2 = p + ks1 + (1-k)s2           from which  
q = (1/2)[ A + ks1 + (1-k)s2]   
 
∂q/∂s1  = k/2    and   ∂q/∂s2 =  (1-k)/2  
∂p/∂s1 = ∂q/∂s1 - k =  -k/2   
 
π = [p+ks1+(1-k)s2]q= q2 
 
Optimal policies: 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = - Lh(∂p/∂s1) + ∂( zπ - s1kq)/∂s1  
 
              = kLh/2 +  z2q(∂q/∂s1) – kq  – s1k (∂q/∂s1)   
              
              = kLh/2  + zkq  –kq - s1k2/2   = 0 , from which  
 
 
s1 =  -  2(1-z- Lh/2)q/k.      Correspondingly, 
 
s2 = - 2(z –Lf/2 )q/(1-k).        Inserting  
 
q = (1/2)[ A + ks1 + (1-k)s2]  =  (1/2)[A – 2(1-z- Lh/2)q – 2(z- Lf/2)q]   
    = (1/2) (A -q)         (note that Lh + Lf = 1) 
 
 
q = A/3    and so π = (A/3)2 
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(iii)  MERGER: ALL PRODUCTION TO ONE COUNTRY 
 
max π = (p+s)q = (A-q+s)q 
 q 
 
∂π/∂q = A-2q+s = 0 or q = (1/2)(A+s) . From these, 
 
q = A-q+s = p+s 
 
∂q/∂s = 1/2          ∂p/∂s = ∂q/∂s – 1 =  - ½ 
 
π = (p+s)q = q2          ∂π/∂s = 2q∂q/∂s = q 
 
If production is in h-country, the foc for optimal policy s is 
 
∂wh /∂s =  - Lhq(∂p/∂s) + ∂zπ/∂s – q – s∂q/∂s  
 
             = Lhq/2 + 2zq(∂q/∂s) – q – s(∂q/∂s) 
 
           =q Lh/2 + zq – q – s/2  = 0,  from which  
 
s = -2(1-z-Lh/2)q   Inserting 
 
q = (1/2)(A - 2(1-z- Lh/2)q)      from which 
 
q(1 + (1-z- Lh/2)) = (1/2)A   or 
 
q = A / (4-2z-Lh) and so   
 
π = [A / (4-2z- Lh)]2   
 
Correspondingly, if production is in f- country 
 
s = -2(z-Lf/2)q 
 
π = [A/(2+2z - Lf)]2  
 
That country is chosen where the profit is larger, so 
 
if h-country is producer, it must be that 
 
4-2z- Lh < 2+2z - Lf  = 2+2z -(1- Lh) = 1+2z+Lh or 
 
2z+Lh > 3/2 implying that π = [A / (4-2z- Lh)]2 > [A/2.5]2 
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If f-country is producer, it must be that 
 
4-2z- (1-Lf ) > 2+2z - Lf or 1/2 > 2z - Lf  
 
implying π = [A/(2+2z - Lf)]2 > [A/2.5] 
 
 
 
THE MERGER GAME  
 
 
If production takes place in h-country s = = -2(1-z-Lh/2)q  So 
 
∂s/∂s =  2q(∂z/∂s) – 2 (1-z-Lh/2)(∂q/∂s)  where ∂q/∂s = ½ 
 
From this, 
 
 ∂z/∂s = (2-z-Lh/2) / 2q from which ∂s/∂z = 2q/(2-z-Lh/2) = -∂s/∂(1-z)  
 
 
If production takes place in f-country s = -2(z-Lf/2)q. Differentiating: 
 
1 = -2q(∂z/∂s) -2(z-Lh/2)(∂q/∂s) or 
 
∂z/∂s = -(1+z-Lf/2)/2q or  
 
∂s/∂z = -∂s/∂(1-z) = -2q/(1+z-Lf/2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARD NASH BARGAINING GAME     
 
 
The Nash product is  [zπ -π1][ (1-z)π-π2]  
 
The first order condition is presented in Eq. (5) in the text: 
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π + zq(∂s/∂z)                   π  + (1-z)q(∂s/∂(1-z)) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––       (5) 
zπ  - π1                             (1-z)π - π2  
 
Inserting the derivatives we obtain if production is in h-country 
 
 
 
π + 2zq2/(2-z-Lh/2)         π  -  2(1-z)q2/(2-z-Lh/2) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––        
zπ  - π1                               (1-z)π   - π2   
                 
 
If production is in f-country. 
 
π -  2zq2/(1+z-Lf/2)               π  +  2(1-z)q2/(1+z-Lf/2) 
–––––––––––––             =           ––––––––––––––––––––        
   zπ  - π1                                    (1-z)π   - π2                    
 
 
 
 
 
Co-operative policies 
 
 
∂(wh+wf) /∂s =  - q(∂p/∂s) + ∂π/∂s – q – s∂q/∂s  
 
             = q/2 + 2q(∂q/∂s) – q – s(∂q/∂s) 
 
           =q /2 + q – q – s/2  = 0  or s = q 
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SEC.5. HETEROGENOUS GOODS: COURNOT  
UNIT COSTS = 0, ALL EXPORTED TO A THIRD COUNTRY 
 
NATIONAL FIRMS 
 
Firms' profit maximization: 
 
The profits are π1 =  (p1+ s1)q1  = (C-q1 -ßq2+s1)q1 
 
                      π2  =  (p2+ s2)q2  = (C-q2 -ßq1+s2)q2 
 
Profit maximization yields: 
 
                    C  -  2q1-  ßq2   + s1   = 0 
 
                    C  -  2q2-  ßq1   + s2    = 0 
 
These can also be written as 
 
                     p1 =  C  -  q1-  ßq2    =  q1 – s1    
 
                     p2 =  C  -  q2-  ßq1    =  q2 – s2   
   
From the latter pair 
  
                     π1 =  q12  and π2 =  q22 
 
From the former pair 
 
                    q1 = [ (2-ß)C + 2s1 – ßs2] / [4-ß2] 
 
                    q2 = [ (2-ß)C + 2s2 – ßs1] / [4-ß2]  
                   ∂q1/∂s1   = 2/(4-ß2)                                                                                       
 
                   ∂q2/∂s1  =  -ß/(4-ß2)                                                                                       
                  ∂p1/∂s1 = ∂q1/∂s1 – 1 = -(2-ß
2)/(4-ß2) 
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                  ∂p2/∂s1 = ∂q2/∂s1 = -ß/(4-ß2) 
 
 
 
Governments' welfare maximization and policy choice: 
 
Welfare is the national firm's profit minus subsidy costs. The f.o.c. for welfare 
maximization in h-country is: 
 
∂wh/∂s1 =   ∂π1/∂s1 – q1 - s1(∂q1/∂s1) = 2q1(∂q1/∂s1) – q1 - s1(∂q1/∂s1)   
              =   0      
 
Inserting the derivatives yields  
 
      s1  =   q1ß
2/2                                                                     
 
For f-country, symmetrically, 
       
     s2 =  q2ß
2/2                                                                         
 
The solution is q1 = q2 , p1 = p2 and s1 = s2 =  q1ß2/2  
Inserting these yields q1 = [ (2-ß)C + 2s1 – ßs2] / [4-ß2] = (C +s1)/(2+ß) or 
  
      q1 = q2  =  C/(2+ß- 0.5ß2) 
 
     π1 = π2 = q12 = q22 
 
 
MERGER 
 
The profit maximization of the merged enterprise is: 
 
max π = (p1+s1)q1 + (p2+s2)q2 = (C-q1-ßq2+s1)q1 + (C-q2-ßq1+s2)q2                 
q1,q2                          
 
The first order conditions are: 
 
 
   C -  2q1  - ßq2  + s1   = 0 
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   C -  2q2  - ßq1 +  s2   = 0  
which can also be written as 
 
p1   =    C -  q1  - ßq2       =   q1+ ßq2- s1    
 
p2     =   C -  q2  - ßq1       =   q2+ ßq1- s2  
                                                     
From the former pair of focs: 
 
q1 =  [C(1-ß)  + s1- ßs2 ]/ [2(1-ß2)]                                                        
 
∂q1/∂s1 = 1/(2-2ß
2)     and               ∂q2/∂s1   = -ß/(2-2ß2) 
 
∂p1/∂s1 =  -∂q1/∂s1- ß∂q2/∂s1  =   -1/2         and       ∂p1/∂s2 = 0. 
 
Analogous forms for  good 2. 
 
Using the latter pair of focs: 
 
π  = (p1+s1)q1 + (p2+s2)q2   
      = q1(q1+ ßq2) + q2(q2+ ßq1) = q12 + 2ß q1q2 + q22 
 
Differentiating:  
 
∂π/∂s1 = 2q1(∂q1/∂s1) +2ßq1(∂q2/∂s1)+ 2ßq2(∂q1/∂s1) + 2q2(∂q2/∂s1) = 
 
= 2q1/(2-2ß2) - 2ßq1ß/(2-2ß2))+ 2ßq2/(2-2ß2) - 2q2ß/(2-2ß2) =  q1  
 
Correspondingly 
 
∂π/∂s2 = q2 
 
  
h-country's welfare maximization: 
 
∂wh/∂s1 =  z[∂π/∂s1] -  ∂(s1q1)/∂s1 = zq1 - q1 - s1/(2-2ß2) = 0, from this 
 
                  s1= -2(1-z )(1-ß2)q1     (11a) 
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f-country's welfare maximization: 
 
 ∂wf/∂s2  =  (1-z)[∂π/∂s2] -  ∂(s2q2)/∂s2 = 0, from which  
                s2 = -2z(1-ß2)q2          (11b)                                                                                
 
From merger game (see later) z = ½ and so q1 = q2 and  s1 = s2 = -(1-ß2)q1  
= -(1-ß2)q2  and so 
 
q1 = [C+s] / [2(1+ß)]   
(2+2ß)q1  = C – (1-ß2)q1   or  q1 = C / (3+2ß-ß2) = q2  
 
π = q12 + 2ß q1q2 + q22 = 2(1+ß)q12 
 
 
π = 2(1+ß)C2/ (3+2ß-ß2)2 
 
 
THE MERGER GAME 
 
We have s1= -2(1-z )(1-ß2)q1.Differentiating this  implicitly with respect to s1 yields: 
 
∂s1/∂s1 = 2(1-ß2)q1(∂z/∂s1) - 2(1-ß2)(1-z)(∂q1/∂s1) or 
 
1 = 2(1-ß2)q1(∂z/∂s1) - 2(1-ß2)(1-z)/(2-2ß2)or  
∂z/∂s1 = (2-z)/[2(1-ß2)q1]. Inverting  
 
∂s1/∂z  = 2(1-ß2)q1/(2-z).  
We have s2 = -2z(1-ß2)q2. Differentiating this  implicitly with respect to s2 
yields: 
 
∂s2/∂s2 = -2(1-ß2)q2(∂z/∂s2) - 2(1-ß2)z(∂q2/∂s2) or  
1 = -2(1-ß2)q2(∂z/∂s2) - 2(1-ß2)z/(2-2ß2) or 
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∂z/∂s2 = -(1+z)/[2(1-ß2)q2]. Inverting  
∂s2/∂z  =  -2(1-ß2)q2/(1+z) 
 
 
Because π = π(s1,s2),  
dπ/dz = (∂π/∂s1)(∂s1/∂z) + (∂π/∂s2)(∂s2/∂z) 
 
         = q1(∂s1/∂z) + q2(∂s2/∂z)  
 
Maximizing the Nash product yields Eq.(5) in the text: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
π + z(∂π/∂z)              π  + (1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z)) 
–––––––––––––      =      ––––––––––––––––––––      (5)    
zπ  - π1                               (1-z)π - π2  
 
From the merged firm's profit maximization we obtained 
 
π = π(s1,s2) where ∂π/∂s1 = q1 and ∂π/∂s2 = q2 
 
 
From this and the derivatives above: 
 
∂π/∂z =  (∂π /∂s1)(∂s1/∂z) + (∂π /∂s2)(∂s2/∂z) 
 
          = 2(q1)2(1-ß2)/(2 -z)  -  2(q2)
2(1-ß2)/(1+z) 
 
 
∂π/∂(1-z) = (∂π/∂z)[∂z/∂(1-z)] = -∂π/∂z 
 
         = - 2(q1)2(1-ß2)/(2-z)  +  2(q2)
2(1-ß2)/(1+z) 
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Using these we obtain Eqs. (12a) and (12b) in the text. We can now see that 
the solution of the dynamic game is such that q1= q2 and z = 1-z = ½ (from 
which s1= s2 and p1 = p2). 
 
 
 
Comparing the welfares  
 
National firms: 
 
wh = π1 –s1q1  = q12 – (ß2/2)q12 = (1-ß2/2)q12  = wf  
q1 = (C+s1)/(2+ß)  or (2+ß)q1 = C + (ß2/2)q1 from which  
q1 = C/(2+ß-ß2/2)  = q2 
 
wh = (1-ß2/2)C2 / (2+ß-ß2/2)2 
 
National firms without subsidies: 
 
wh  = π1 = q12 
 
q1 = C /(2+ß) 
 
wh = C2 /(2+ß)2 
 
 
Merger (notice the solution where q1= q2 and z = 1-z = ½)  
wh  = π/2 – s1q1 =(1/2) [(q1+ßq2)q2 + [(q2+ßq1)q1]  + (1-ß2)q12 
 
     = (1+ß)q12 + (1-ß2)q12   = (2 +ß –ß2)q12 = wf 
 
q1 = (C+s1)/((2+2ß) = [B-(1-ß2)q1] /[2+2ß] or  
q1 = C/(3+2ß-ß2) = q2 
 
wh = (2 +ß –ß2)C2/(3+2ß-ß2)2 
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SEC.6. BERTRAND COMPETITION , UNIT COSTS = 0, ALL 
EXPORTED TO A THIRD COUNTRY   
 
The demand functions are 
 
   q1= B – p1 + bp2  and q2= B – p2 + bp1                       
 
NATIONAL FIRMS 
 
The profit maximizations of national firms are 
 
  max (p1 + s1)q1 = (p1 + s1) (B – p1 + bp2) 
   p1 
 
  max (p2 + s2)q2 = (p2 + s2) (B – p2 + bp1) 
   p2  
The first order conditions (focs) are 
 
B – 2p1 + bp2 - s1     = 0 
 
B – 2p2 + bp1 - s2     = 0 
 
The focs can also be written as 
 
 q1= B – p1 + bp2 =  p1 + s1    
  
q2  = B – p2 + bp1 =  p2 + s2                                                                
 
From the former pair of focs 
 
  p1= [(2+b)B - 2s1- bs2]/ (4-b2)  
  p2= [(2+b)B - 2s2- bs1]/ (4-b2)                     
 
  ∂p1/∂s1  = ∂p2/∂s2  = -2/(4-b2)    
 ∂p2/∂s1  = ∂p1/∂s2  =  -b/(4-b2)     
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and applying the latter pair of focs                 
 
  ∂q1/∂s1= ∂p1/∂s1  + 1 = (2-b2)/(4-b2)   =  ∂q2/∂s2  
  ∂q2/∂s1 = ∂p2/∂s1  = -b/(4-b2)   
 
Also from the latter pair, the profits of the national firms are 
 
    π1 = (p1 + s1)q1  = q12  and π2 = q22 
 
From these 
 
 ∂π1/∂s1 = 2q1(2-b2)/(4-b2)   
 ∂π2/∂s2 = 2q2(2-b2)/(4-b2) 
 
 
Optimal policy for h-country is obtained from the condition 
 
∂wh/∂s1 = ∂π1 /∂s1  - q1 – s1(∂q1/∂s1) = 0   or 
 
  -b2q1/(4-b2)   – s1(2-b
2)/(4-b2) = 0. From this, 
 
                  s1 =     -b
2q1/(2-b
2) < 0 . Correspondingly, 
 
                  s2 =  -b
2q2/(2-b
2) < 0 
 
Obviously,  p1 = p2 , s1 = s2 , q1 = q2  and π1 = π2. Using foc 
 
q1 = p1 + s1 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( ((((((((((((((((((= [[(2+b)B - 2s1- bs2]/ (4-b
2) + s1 
 
     = (B – s1)/(2-b)  + s1 = B/(2-b)  + s1(1-b)/(2-b)     or  
(2-b)q1 = B ((((((( ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( + s1(1-b) = B – (1-b)b2q1/(2-b2)              or 
 
[ (2-b)(2-b2) + (1-b)b2]q1= (2-b2)B   or  
(4 – 2b2 – 2b + b3 + b2– b3)q1 = (2-b2)B  or 
 
q1 = (2-b2)B/(4-2b – b2) = q2  
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π1    = B2 (2-b2)2/(4-2b – b2)2  = π2  
 
 
 
MERGER  
 
max π = (p1 + s1) (B - p1 + bp2 ) + (p2 + s2) (B - p2 + bp1) 
p1,p2 
 
 
The first order conditions are: 
 
               B - 2p1   + 2bp2 - s1 + bs2 = 0                      
   
               B + 2bp1 -  2p2 -  s2 + bs1 = 0                        
or  
 
             q1 = B - p1   + bp2 = p1 - bp2 + s1 - bs2                 
 
             q2 = B - p2   + bp1 = p2 - bp1 + s2 - bs1                  
 
From the former pair, 
 
               (2-2b2)p1= (1+b)B - (1-b
2)s1                                         
               (2-2b2)p2= (1+b)B - (1-b
2)s2  
From these, 
 
             ∂p1/∂s1 = ∂p2/∂s2   =  -1/2    
             ∂p1/∂s2 = ∂p2/∂s1    =  0                                                 
 
             ∂q1/∂s1 =∂p1/∂s1 - b∂p2/∂s1  + 1 = 1/2    = ∂q2/∂s2   
             ∂q1/∂s2=∂p1/∂s2 - b∂p2/∂s2  - b = -b/2  =   ∂q2/∂s1               
 
 
π = (p1 + s1)q1 +   (p2 + s2)q2. So, 
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 ∂π/∂s1 =  
= (∂p1/∂s1+1)q1 +(p1 + s1)(∂q1/∂s1) + (∂p2/∂s1)q2 + (p2 + s2)∂q2/∂s1 
  
= (-1/2+1)(p1-bp2+s1- bs2)+(p1 + s1)(1/2) + 0q2+ (p2+ s2)(-b/2) 
 
 
= p1+ s1 - b(p2+s2) = q1 (the last form from focs) 
 
Correspondingly,  
 
  ∂π/∂s2  =  q2 
 
 
The first order condition for determining optimal policy is, for h-country, 
 
∂wh/∂s1 =  z(∂π/∂s1) - q1 - s1(∂q1/∂s1) = 0. Inserting the derivatives, 
 
                  s1 = -2(1- z)q1   (13a)   
 
Correspondingly, 
 
                  s2 = -zq2              (13b) 
 
 
 
THE MERGER GAME 
 
 s1 = -2(1-z)q1   and s2 = -2zq2  
∂s1/∂s1 = 2q1(∂z/∂s1) - 2(1-ß2)(1-z)(∂q1/∂s1)     or 
 
1 = 2q1(∂z/∂s1) - (1-z)   or 
 
∂z/∂s1 = (2-z)/[2q1] . From this, ∂s1/∂z = 2q1/(2-z)  
∂s2/∂s2 = -2q2(∂z/∂s2) - 2z(∂q2/∂s2) or 
 
1 = -2q2(∂z/∂s2) - 2z/2 or  
  
47 
47 
∂z/∂s2 = (1+z)/[2q2]  from which ∂s2/∂z = -2q2/(1+z) 
 
Because π = π(s1,s2), 
 
dπ/dz = (∂π/∂s1)(∂s1/∂z) + (∂π/∂s2)(∂s2/∂z)  
 
         = q1(∂s1/∂z) + q2(∂s2/∂z) 
 
where  
 
        ∂s1/∂z = 2q1/ (2-z )= - ∂s1/∂(1-z)                                       
 
        ∂s2/∂z  = - 2q2/ (1+ z )   = - ∂s2/∂(1-z)      
 
As before, maximizing the Nash product yields Eq. (5) in the text: 
 
  
π + z(∂π/∂z)                   π  + (1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z)) 
–––––––––––––      =           ––––––––––––––––––––         (5) 
zπ  - π1                             (1-z)π - π2  
 
where 
 
∂π/∂z =  (∂π /∂s1)(∂s1/∂z) + (∂π /∂s2)(∂s2/∂z)  
∂π/∂(1-z) = -∂π/∂z 
 
 
Inserting the derivatives we obtain Eqs. (14a) and (14b) in the text:  
 
z(∂π/∂z)                                              (14a) 
                                                                                                      
 = 2z(q1)2/ (2-z)  -  2z(q2)
2/ (1+z)                                                          
 
 and       
 
(1-z)(∂π/∂(1-z))  =      
                                                                        (14b)                                      
-  2(1- z)(q1)
2/(2-z)   +  2(1-z)(q2)
2/(1+z)  
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The outcome in the overall dynamic game is z = 1-z = ½,  p1 = p2 , s1 = s2 , q1 
= q2  . Accordingly, from the foc of profit maximization  
q1 = (p1 + s1)(1-b) = [B/(2-2b) – s1/2 + s1](1-b) =  
                              = B/2 – (1-b)q1 /2    or  
                   (3-b)q1 = B   
 
(1/2)π = (1/2) (p1+s1)q1 + (1/2)(p2+s2)q2 = (p1+s1)q1  
            = q12/(1-b)   =  B2 / [(3-b)2(1-b)]  
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SEC.7. COURNOT, HOMOGENOUS GOOD, ALL EXPORTED TO 
A THIRD COUNTRY. n FIRMS IN h-COUNTRY, ONE FIRM IN f-
COUNTRY. UNIT COSTS = 0  
 
 
 
NATIONAL FIRMS 
 
h-country firm i produces qi , i = 1,...,n , subsidy/tax = s 
 
f-country: firm f produces qf,   subsidy/tax s* 
 
Price p = A - Σ qi - qf 
                     
Profit maximization: 
 
max πi = (p+s)qi = (A - Σ qi - qf +s)qi              i = 1,...,n 
 qi  
 
max πf = (p+s*)qf = (A - Σ qi - qf + s*)qf 
  qf  
 
First degree conditions are: 
 
∂πi/∂qi  =    A - Σ qj   - 2qi -  qf + s = 0  , i,j = 1,..,n ,i≠j 
 
∂πf/∂qf   =   A - Σ qi    -  2qf + s*  = 0 
 
From the first n equations q1 = q2 = ...=qn.. Using this,  focs become 
 
 
              A - (n-1)qi   - 2qi -  qf + s   = 0  
              A -  nqi                 -  2qf + s*  = 0          or 
 
 
 
              A - (n+1))qi        -  qf + s   = 0 
 
              A -         nqi         -  2qf + s*  = 0 
Solving: 
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qi  = [A+2s-s*)/(n+2)  
qf  = A - (n+1))qi   + s = [A-ns + ((n+1)s*]/(n+2) 
 
p = A - nqi - qf  
 
= { (n+2) A - n[A+2s-s*] - [A-ns + ((n+1)s*] } / (n+2) 
 
= (A-ns-s*)/(n+2) 
 
 
Welfare maximization: 
 
wh = Σ πi  - Σ sqi  = nπi - nsqi = n(p+s)qi - nsqi = npqi 
  =n{ (A-ns-s*)/(n+2) } { [A+2s-s*)/(n+2)} 
 
= [n/(n+2)2] (A-ns-s*)(A+2s-s*) = Ω (A-ns-s*)(A+2s-s*) 
 
∂wh/∂s = Ω [-n(A+2s-s*) + 2(A-ns-s*)] 
 
= Ω [ (2-n)A - 4ns - (2-n)s* ] = 0 
 
 
wf = πf  - s*qf  = pqf  
 
= { (A-ns-s*)/(n+2) }{ [A-ns + ((n+1)s*]/(n+2) } 
 
= [1/(n+2)2] (A-ns-s*)[A-ns + ((n+1)s*] 
 
∂wf/∂s* = [1/(n+2)2][-A+ns-(n+1)s* +(n+1)A-(n+1)ns-(n+1)s* ]  
 
           = [1/(n+2)2][nA -n2s -2(n+1)s*]  = 0 
 
 
 
The equations system becomes: 
 
(2-n)A - 4ns   - (2-n)s*     = 0 
 
nA        -n2s   -2(n+1)s*    = 0 
 
From these, 
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s = (2-n)(3n+2)A / (n3+6n2+8n) 
 
s* = n(6-n)A / (n2+6n+8) 
 
 
 
AN ILLUSTRATION: n = 2.  
 
National firms.    
 
Setting n = 2 above: 
 
s = 0, s* = 2(6-2)A/(4+12+8) = A/3 
 
q1 = q2  = (A+2s-s*)/(n+2) = 2A/12 = A/6  
qf   = [A-ns + ((n+1)s*]/(n+2) = (A+3A/3)/4 = A/2 
 
p = A - nqi - qf  = A -A/3 - A/2 = (6A-2A-3A)/6 = A/6  
π1 = π2 = pq1 = A2/36 
 
πf = (p+s*)qf  = (A/6+A/3)A/2 =A2/4 
 
 
Merger 12  between h-country firms 1 and 2.  
 
The results are as presented in Sec. 3 in the text: 
 
π12 = (A/2.5)2 = A2/6.25 > A2/18 = π1+π2 
 
πf = (A/2.5)2 = A2/6.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
